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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 57 May, 1955 Number 2
THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF HEARSAY*
THOzuAS P. HRnMAi**
T is generally agreed that the hearsay rule forbids the use of a
challenged extrajudicial utterance only when it is offered for
an assertive purpose, namely, for the purpose of proving the truth
of the matter asserted in the utterance., But, quite apart from
the many exceptions to the exclusionary rule, there is great un-
certainty in the cases and textbooks as to the extent of the coverage
of the rule itself-as to the extent of what may be called the hearsay
fringe, the twilight zone of hearsay.2 Just when is an extrajudicial
utterance offered for the unforbidden nonassertive purpose? Is
nonverbal conduct, e.g., silence offered for an assertive purpose,
within the hearsay fringe and therefore inadmissible unless it falls
within some exception to the rule? If so, to what extent or in
what way must an "act" (nonverbal conduct) be assertive in order
to be banned as hearsay? Must the actor intend his act to be
assertive of some pertinent belief of his?
I. Verbal Conduct as Hearsay
The basic problem herein discussed is interestingly illustrated
in a comparatively recent West Virginia case, State v. Corbin,3 in
which the prosecution in a homicide case contended inter alia
that Corbin, the defendant, had placed the victim's gun near the
victim's body and had obliterated the fingerprints on the weapon
*Address (written version) delivered at a meeting of the Marion County
Bar Association, December 16, 1954.
*Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
'See, e.g., State v. Paun, 109 W. Va. 606, 155 S.E. 656 (1930); 6 WiGoRE,
EVmENCE § 1766 (3d ed. 1940).
2Cf. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YAiE L.J. 489 (1930);
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HAv. L. REv. 177 (1948).
3 117 W. Va. 241, 186 S.E. 179 (1936).
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or had caused them to be obliterated in order to prevent proof
of the fact that he had placed the gun in such a position-
a position favorable to the defendant's theory of the case. The
challenged utterance was that, about thirty minutes after the
decedent had been shot, Corbin had cautioned certain officers
present at the scene of the shooting not to touch the gun until
the coroner arrived because he (Corbin) wished to preserve
any fingerprints that might be upon it. Does this utterance,
offered to prove that the accused had not placed the gun near the
victim's body and had not obliterated the fingerprints or caused
them to be obliterated, violate the hearsay rule? The trial court
excluded the evidence. But the Supreme Court of Appeals, in
reversing the lower court, held that the statement was not offered
for an assertive purpose. Said the court:
"The evidence was not hearsay, its purpose not being to
establish the truth of anything that Corbin said, but merely
the fact that he said itA . . .Where it becomes relevant to show
that a certain statement or declaration was made, regardless
of the truth or falsity of the statement cr declaration itself,
such proof is not hearsay and should be admitted. It is
evidence of what, in some of the books, is termed a 'verbal
fact.' "5
A similar question arose in State v. Cropper," decided by the
supreme court of Missouri. In that case the accused, charged with
murder, had extrajudicially requested the sheriff to have two empty
shotgun shells examined for fingerprints. The court held that this
request, offered by the defendant, was inadmissible on the ground
that it was a self-serving declaration, that is, hearsay-a result ap-
parently contra to the holding in the Corbin case.
What, then, is the test as to whether extrajudicial verbal con-
duct is hearsay? "The theory of the Hearsay rule," says Wigmore
on Evidence,7 "is that, when a human utterance is offered as evi-
dence of the truth of the matter asserted in it, the credit of the
assertor becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore the asser-
tion can be received only when made upon the stand subject to the
test of cross-examination." If the utterance is not so offered, the
hearsay rule does not exclude the evidence for the reason that the
rationale of the rule does not apply, to wit, untrustworthiness of
the evidence based chiefly on want of cross-examination, want of
4 Id. at 254.
5 Id. at 241 (point 4 of syllabus).
6 327 Mo. 193, 36 S.W.2d 923 (1931).
7 6 WIGMORE, EVIDE NCE § 1766.
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oath and want of confrontation.8 As Wigmore puts it, "The pro-
hibition of the Hearsay rule .... does not apply to all words or
utterances as such. . The Hearsay rule excludes extrajudicial
utterances only when offered for a special purpose, namely, as
assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted."9
A good West Virginia example of an extrajudicial utterance
offered for the unforbidden nonassertive purpose is State v. Paun.10
In that case, an indictment for unlawfully selling liquor in the
defendant's poolroom, it appeared that an officer had requested the
defendant to get him some liquor. The defendant claimed that
the officer had entrapped him into getting the liquor for him. The
officer's explanation for attempting the purchase was that he had
information that whiskey was being sold in the poolroom. It was
contended that the extrajudicial information thus offered and
thus allegedly relied upon by the officer was hearsay. But the court
held, and quite correctly, that the evidence, so offered, did not
violate the hearsay rule. Here the extrajudicial assertion was
relevant without reference to its truth or falsity. Whether true or
false, this information could be reasonable ground for the action
of the officer in attempting to make the purchase of liquor.
The Paun case is essentially like the much-cited case of
Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co."1 In that case there was an issue as
to whether the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that
the plaintiffs 'credit was impaired. The evidence offered to prove
this was a report from a mercantile agency organized to, secure
credit ratings for clients. This report stated that the business
record of the plaintiffs concern was not good as the concern had
failed to meet its obligations promptly and fairly. In admitting
this evidence, the court said, "The defendant offered this report,
not as evidencing the truth of the statements it contained, but for
the purpose of showing the good faith of the defendant in refusing
shipment, and to show the information on which it acted in refusing
credit." 12
Thus, neither in the Paun case nor in the Trainor case did the
evidence, for the purpose for which it was offered, require that the
85 WlG om, EVmENCE §§ 1361, 1362, 1365; Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945, 59 HAIv. L. REv. 481, 541 (1946): "Hearsay is excluded because of
potential infirmities with respect to the observation, memory, narration and
veracity of him who utters the offered words when not under oath and subject
to cross-examination."
9 6 WIGAIoRE, EvmENCE § 1766.
10 109 W. Va. 606, 155 SYE. 656 (1930).
11 154 Minn. 204, 191 N.W. 431 (1923).
12 Id. at 206.
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credit of the extrajudicial declarant be used as a basis for the
inference sought to be drawn from the challenged assertion. If in
the Paun case the information upon which the officer allegedly
relied had been offered to prove that the defendant had sold liquor
in the poolroom, the evidence would have been offered for an as-
sertive purpose. Similarly, in the Trainor case, if the commercial
report had been offered to prove that the plaintiffs credit was not
good, it would have been excluded by the hearsay rule.
How, then, about the offer in the first-mentioned West Virginia
case, State v. Corbin? In that case the challenged statement did
not in terms assert the matter sought to be proved by the statement.
But was not the credit of. the extrajudicial declarant used as the
basis of the inference sought to be drawn? It would seem that
Corbin, in telling the officers he wanted the fingerprints on the
gun preserved, was impliedly saying, "The fingerprints are not
mine." And to that extent, at least, did not his statement assert
his innocence, and was not his sincerity thereby put in issue?'3 The
utterance was, it would seem, offered for an assertive purpose. Is it
necessary, then, that such verbal conduct should purport to be
assertive of the matter sought to be proved before it can be classed
as hearsay?
A celebrated case in point, and the leading decision on the
question, is Wright v. Tatham.14 In that case there was an issue as
to whether a testator was of sound mind. The challenged evidence
was certain letters written to the testator as to matters of business
tending to show the writers' beliefs that the testator was of sound
mind. The court held the evidence to be inadmissible hearsay.
Yet the excluded evidence, which consisted of ordinary business
letters, did not purport to assert even indirectly that the writers
believed the testator to be of sound mind.
The recent Virginia case of Tate v. Chumbleyal5 is in point.
In that case there was an issue as to whether the testatrix of an
attested will was of sound mind. One item of evidence offered to
prove this was an attestation clause of an unavailable subscribing
witness. The clause did not purport to assert anything whatever
13 Another value (probably not the dominant one) may be assigned to the
offer of Corbin's statement, in that it may also have meant, "I do not intend to
obliterate the fingerprints on the gun." As such, it is likewise assertive, and
therefore hearsay, although it might nevertheless be admissible under the
hearsay exception for Declarations Evidencing Mental Condition. As to possible
admissibility under that exception, see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145
U.S. 285 (1892); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); 6 WIOMORE,
EvmNcE § 1714 et seq.
14 5 Cl. & F. 670 (H.L. 1838).
15 190 Va. 480, 57 S.E.2d 151 (1950).
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as to the testatrix's sanity. Does such an attestation clause, then,
constitute an extrajudicial assertion that the testatrix was sane at
the time of executing the will? The court held that the signature
of an attesting witness was, in effect, an assertion by such witness
that the testatrix was sane at the time the will was executed and
was admissible to prove sanity."" The evidence is admissible under
the exception to the hearsay rule known as "Attestation of a Sub-
scribing Witness."' 7  If the attester were available, the evidence of
course would be inadmissible hearsay.' s Although some courts do
not consider that an ordinary attestation clause constitutes an
implied assertion that the testator is sane, the view of the Virginia
court is commonly followed. 9 Thus, where this view prevails, it
seems clear that extrajudicial verbal conduct need not purport to
refer even indirectly to the matter allegedly asserted in order to be
classed as a hearsay assertion with respect to such matter. The
test is, rather, whether the irtterance is offered for an assertive
purpose.
A recent federal case, much like the West Virginia case of
State v. Corbin but reaching a contrary conclusion, is Herman v.
United States.20 In that case, a prosecution for liquor violation,
the defendant attempted to show that he had told the sheriff that
he did not want any liquor on his premises and that he requested
the sheriff to come and get it. The court excluded the evidence-
and justifiably, it is believed-on the ground that it was a self-
serving declaration. To be sure, as this commentator has hereto-
fore attempted to prove in an article in the West Virginia Law
Review, 2' there is no special rule excluding extrajudicial self-
serving declarations. But such evidence does violate the hearsay
rule when it is is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
it, and therefore is inadmissible unless it falls within some excep-
tion to the rule.
Although there are innumerable other examples of verbal con-
duct which have been held to be indirect assertions and inadmissible
when offered for their assertive value unless they come within some
exception, the following additional illustrations must suffice for
16 Obviously the problem does not arise where the attestation clause (as is
often the case) contains words asserting in more or less appropriate terms that
the witnesses believe the testator to be of sound mind.
'7 See 5 Wm oRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1505, 1513.
IS d. § 1506.
19Id. § 1511. See dictum in Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376, 388 (1881).
20 48 F.2d 479 (1931).
21 Hardman, Hearsay: "Self-Serving" Declarations, 52 W. VA. L. Rav. 81
(1950).
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present purposes:' (1) a statement to an officer showing willingness
to surrender;22 (2) a statement by the defendant that he had shot
the deceased in self-defense;2 3 (3) a statement by the defendant that
another person had killed the deceased; 24 (4) an extrajudicial com-
plaint to an officer seeking to have someone else arrested for the
offense.25
The last-mentioned example, State v. Teitle,26 deserves brief
comment. In that case, an indictment for arson, it was contended
that the complaint to an officer, accusing another person of the
crime and requesting his arrest, was competent evidence to show
that the defendant was not a particeps-that it was admissible to
show his "consciousness of ifnnocence." 27  The supreme court of
Vermont held the evidence inadmissible, apparently on the ground
that it was a self-serving declaration. The court relied largely on
Wharton's Criminal Evidence28 which treats such evidence as hear-
say-as "a self-serving declaration" not coming within any exception
to the hearsay rule. Said the court:
"[Wigmore on Evidence29 ] admits ... that a majority of
the courts exclude such evidence in favor of the accused, and
the cases cited seem to show much more than a majority so
holding. Wharton's Criminal Evidence . . . states that 'if
such evidence were competent anyone guilty of a crime could
supply himself with evidence by making statements in his favor
or for that matter, commit overt acts in his favor, which he
could introduce in the trial of a crime with which he is
charged to show his innocence.' "30
II. Nonverbal Conduct As Hearsay
When an extrajudicial act (nonverbal conduct) of a person is
offered for an assertive purpose, that is, for the purpose of proving
the belief of the actor as to a pertinent matter and hence for the
purpose of proving the existence of the occurrence or condition thus
evidenced, does not such conduct, so offered, have the same major
hearsay vices, namely, want of cross-examination, want of oath and
want of confrontation, as would an extrajudicial utterance asserting
such occurrence or condition? Now, if an extrajudicial verbal
assertion having the same assertive quality as such nonverbal con-
22 Patton v. Com., 235 Ky. 845, 32 S.W.2d 405 (1930).
23 Vandorff v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 448, 32 S.W.2d 468 (1930).
24 McIntosh v. Com., 234 Ky. 192, 27 S.W.2d 971 (1930).
25 State v. Teitle, 117 Vt. 190, 90 A.2d 562 (1952).
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 201.
2SWHaRTON'S CRIMINAL EvmE~ca § 505 (11th ed. 1935).
29 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 174; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 293.
80 117 Vt. 190 at 202. Emphasis supplied.
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duct would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule or
because it is not offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted, the
equivalent nonverbal conduct should of course be admissible-and
in such situations such conduct is generally admitted."' All relevant
evidence is admissible unless there is some legal rule or principle
excluding it.32
But suppose such conduct (act), when offered for the purpose
of proving a pertinent belief of the actor and hence for the purpose
of proving the occurrence or condition so believed, is such that an
equivalent verbal assertion would be excluded by the hearsay rule.
Is such conduct, so offered, hearsay? Is it admissible? Wigmore on
Evidence seems, in general, to take the position that such nonverbal
conduct is not hearsay.33
"A possible objection [to admitting such conduct]," says
Wigmore, "is found in the Hearsay rule; i.e. in looking to a
person's conduct as evidencing the material cause of the con-
duct, are we not virtually receiving the person's hearsay asser-
tion as to the cause? The Hearsay rule excludes extra-
judicial assertions only, i.e. deliberate utterances in terms af-
firming a fact . . .; and, although in effect an inference from
conduct may be the same in result as an inference from asser-
tion, nevertheless the two are distinct. Nor does the policy
or spirit of the Hearsay rule apply; for that policy is to test
the assertion of persons regarded as witnesses, by learning the
source of their knowledge and by exposing its elements of
weakness and error, if possible; so that where the evidence is
not dealing with a person's assertion as deriving force from his
personal character, knowledge, or experience, it is not within
the scope of the policy of the Hearsay rule. No doubt the
line is sometimes hard to draw between conduct used as
circumstantial evidence and assertion used testimonially. Never-
theless the difference is a real one..."3
"In a few specific instances," says Wigmore in another section,- "
the courts commonly admit such conduct as circumstantial evidence.
Among these instances, he says, the following are to be particularly
noted: "(1) a Belief in a Marriage, as evidenced by the conduct of
a pair living and treating each other as husband and wife. .. ;::
(2) A Belief in Legitimacy, as evidenced by the treatment of a child
31 See, e.g., State v. Mayle, 69 S.E.2d 212 (V. Va. 1952) (escape of de-
fendant from jail). See, generally, 2 WNIMORE §§ 265-293.
• 2 Cf. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TRFATISE ON EVIDENCE 265, 530 (1898).
332 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 459. But cf. §§ 267-273.
4 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 459. Cf. §§ 266, 267.
35 Id. § 267.
3G6 Wigmore continues thus: "... this has been from time immemorial
received, whether or not the persons are parties or privies to the suit, and is a
plain use of the double circumstantial inference."
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by its alleged parents.. .;3 (8) A Belief in Personal Name, Family
History, and the like, as evidenced by conduct and language, and
as tending to prove identity with a person in issue.. .;3 (4) a Belief
in a Testamentary or Contractual Act, as evidenced by the alleged
testator's conduct and utterances. .. "39
In some of these instances, notably, groups (1) and (2), the
circumstantial or nontestimonial value of such conduct often out-
weighs its assertive value so that, dominantly, the evidence is not
offered for an assertive purpose, that is, the evidence may be jus-
tifiably regarded as not running afoul of the hearsay ban. But in
other situations, some of which are herein discussed, attempts to
justify admission of such conduct as nonhearsay often seem quite
specious.4o
The simplest type of nonverbal human behavior which courts
ordinarily treat as hearsay is found in the West Virginia case of
Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co.4L In that case there was an issue as
to how one X (deceased) was hurt: whether he was injured by a
broken high-pressure pipeline. X, who was found seriously in-
jured, lying near a severed pipeline, was asked what hurt him. By
way of reply, he (1) pointed to the severed pipeline and (2) also
uttered some words bearing on the question asked. The West
West Virginia court held that the act of pointing was admissible
as a Spontaneous Declaration (as a part of the res gestae), i.e., as an
exception to the hearsay rule. It seems fairly inferable from the
language of the court that such a physical act would have been
excluded if it had not come within that exception to the hearsay
rule. 42 The inference seems sound, although there is some authori-
ty contra.43  Man does not speak by words alone: actions speak
louder than words. And actions like words often tell lies. Hence,
where as in the Starcher case it appears that the challenged extra-
judicial nonverbal act was intended by the actor to be an expression
of his belief, such conduct, if offered to evidence that belief, and
hence to evidence the matter believed, is assertive: it is hearsay:
it has the same sort of untrustworthiness as if the actor had said
37 Wigmore continues thus: ".. . this, again, is a tradition of long standing,
and can be justified only on circumstantial grounds;"38 Wigmore continues thus: ". .. this is recognized in a few instances only,
but seems nevertheless orthodox;"
39 Wigmore continues thus: ". . .This use of like evidence has been sanc-
tioned by a few judges, but there is a decided repudiation of it by others."
40 See 2 WcMoP, EVIDENCE § 271.
4181 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28 (1918).
42 See particularly point 4 of syllabus (by court).
43 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 254 Wis. 320, 36 S.W.2d 86 (1949), admitting
such an act of pointing as nonhearsay.
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in so many words that the severed pipeline (the thing to which he
had pointed) was what had hit him. It is like sign language, which
is clearly hearsay when offered for its assertive value.
But suppose it does not appear that the challenged conduct
was intended by the actor to be assertive of the matter which is
sought to be proved. An excellent example of such conduct is to
be found in the West Virginia case of Crookham v. State.44 There
evidence of the flight of a third party from the scene of a crime was
offered for the accused for the purpose of proving that someone
other than he had committed the offense. This physical act was,
it would seem, offered for its assertive value, namely, to show the
belief of the actor that he was guilty and hence to show the fact
believed. And such evidence, so offered, has commonly been re-
garded as having all the major vices of hearsay. The West Virginia
court, like most courts, excludes such conduct when so offered. 45
The West Virginia court did not, however, assign a reason for the
exclusion; but an Iowa court, in reaching the same conclusion as
the West Virginia court, explained its decision thus: "flight, if
proved, is nothing more than a confession by another." 46 And most
courts, including the West Virginia court, exclude such a verbal
confession of a third party as inadmissible hearsay.47
Quaere, then: Should such nonverbal conduct be considered as
coming within the hearsay fripge? But, first, what is hearsay?
Although a great deal can hardly be expected from any legal
definition, it would seem that, according to the orthodox decisions,
hearsay may be defined adequately enough for present use, as any
extrajudicial assertion, verbal or nonverbal, which is offered for
the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted therein,
thus depending for its value upon the credibility of the extra-
judicial asserter.48 However, as in nearly all definitions which are
simple enough to be useful, most of the terms are apt to need
further defining-and the term "assertion" is believed to be suf-
ficiently broad to include nonverbal conduct assertively offered.
The West Virginia case of State v. Martin49 raises some in-
teresting angles of the problem. That case was. a prosecution for
statutory rape, which does not involve an issue as to consent; and
evidence was offered for the accused that the prosecutrix, aged
44 5 W. Va. 510 (1871).
45 See Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871); Falknor, Silence as Hearsay,
89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 192 n.13 collecting cases (1940).
40 State v. Piernot, 167 Iowa 353, 149 N.W. 446 (1914).
47 State v. Poe, 69 W. Va. 260, 71 S.E. 177 (1911); 5 WiGMoRE, Ev1DENcE § 1476
48 Cf. McCo nmC, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
49 102 W. Va. 107, 134 S.E. 599 (1926).
9
Hardman: The Twilight Zone of Hearsay
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955
HEARSAY
fifteen, had not made any complaint to anyone until eight months
after the alleged attack. Does this failure to complain speedily-
this extrajudicial silence of the prosecutrix, who testified in the
case-violate the hearsay rule? Suppose the evidence offered had
been that the prosecutrix, eight months after the alleged assault,
had told a confidant that there had been no assault. The statement
would of course be admissible as a prior self-contradiction if offered
to impeach her testimony to the effect that she had been attacked,
for then the evidence would not violate the hearsay rule. But it
is almost unanimously held that extrajudicial prior self-contradic-
tions are hearsay and inadmissible when offered as substantive
evidence. 50
Analogously, failure of the prosecutrix to complain speedily of
an attack, like the verbal equivalent that there was no attack, would
be admissible as a virtual self-contradiction for purposes of im-
peaching her testimony.51 Would such failure to complain-such
silence-violate the hearsay rule when it is offered as substantive
evidence for the purpose of proving that there was no attack? The
West Virginia court treated the evidence as admissible, apparently
as substantive evidence although the court did not clearly indicate
whether it was so using the silence. In any event, verbal prior
self-contradictions should, upon principle, be admissible as sub-
stantive evidence since the witness is present in court subject to
cross-examination, thus practically eliminating the major vices of
hearsay (although most courts hold otherwise52 ), and therefore,
upon principle, the equivalent nonverbal conduct, when assertively
offered, should also be admitted. Hence it is easy enough to justify
the use of the silence apparently sanctioned in State v. Martin.
Perhaps it should be noted here that of course relevant extra-
judicial silence of a party to a suit, when the party is under a so-
called duty to speak, is admissible as an admission by conduct and
that according to the better view admissions are admitted as sub-
stantive evidence and as an exception to the hearsay rule. 3 But the
failure of a prosecutrix in a rape case to complain speedily could
not be admitted as an admission, for the prosecutrix is not a party
to such a criminal proceeding.5"
50 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, citing cases.
514 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1135.
52 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018.
53 See e.g., Morrison v. Judy, 123 W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d 751 (1941); Reall
v. Deiriggi, 127 W. Va. 662, 34 S.E.2d 253 (1945); Morgan, Admissions as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YAIm L.J. 355 (1921).
54 Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1076.
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The situation presented in State v. Martin is not unlike those
instances in which there is an issue as to whether there has been
an injurious occurrence or condition. In that class of cases, does
evidence of absence of complaint by other persons affected by the
occurrence or condition violate the hearsay rule? There is a
square conflict of authority as to the admissibility of such silence,
and in general the judicial opinions are not very enlightening as
to the hearsay quality of such evidence. 55
Another example of extrajudicial silence which many courts
treat as hearsay is where, on an issue as to defects in goods or as
to unwholesomeness of food served, evidence is offered to show
that there had been no complaints from other customers who had
made similar purchases or had been similarly served.56 Is sud
silence hearsay? Here again there are cases pro and con as to
whether such conduct is admissible; and the evidence is perhaps
more frequently excluded than admitted, sometimes on the theory
that it violates the hearsay rule.5 7  More or less typical of the cases
condemning such evidence is the comparatively recent federal case
of United States v. 11 Doz. Packages, in which the court ex-
cluded the silence as "clearly hearsay."
A somewhat similar example is found in what Wigmore, as
heretofore mentioned, refers to. as that group of instances in which
an alleged testator's conduct (act), or an alleged contractor's con-
duct, is offered for the purpose of proving the actor's "Belief in a
Testamentary or Contractual Act,"5 9 and hence for the purpose of
proving the matter so believed. For example, suppose that there
is an issue as to whether T made a will. Would failure of the
alleged testator to tell either the family lawyer, or any member of
his family, or any one else, that he had made a will be admissible to
prove that he had not made a will?"° Of course relevant pretesta-
mentary conduct would usually be admissible, for the equivalent
pretestamentary utterance would generally come in under the
hearsay exception for Declarations Evidencing Mental Condition.
But would post-testamentary nonverbal conduct be admissible if
the equivalent post-testamentary utterance would be inadmissible
55 See McCoRmicra, Evm.Ncm § 229 n.27, citing cases; 2 WIGmoPE, EViDENCE
§ 461.
56 See MCCoRMIca, EVIDENCE § 229.
57 Id. § 229, n. 26, collecting numerous cases pro and con. See also Note by
Wallace C. Murchison, Negative Testimony-Silence as Hearsay, 24 N.C.L. Rv.
274 (1946).
5840 F. Supp. 208 (1941).
592 WIGMOR, EVMENCE § 267.
00 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Ala. 529 (1853).
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hearsay? As to this general group of instances, Wigmore claims
that the "circumstantial" nature of the inference sought to be
drawn "strongly dominates the testimonial aspect" and that there-
fore the hearsay rule does not apply."'
Fortunately there is a very recent West Virginia case in point.
In that case, Rice v. Henderson,62 there was an issue as to whether
a nondescript holographic writing signed by one Ross was intended
by him to be a will. The alleged testator's housekeeper was asked
whether Ross showed her the will; and she answered, "He showed
me these papers [the alleged will] ... and, he said, 'If don't have
another will made-don't get Joe Hite to make no other will-you
see that Georgia gets these [papers] at my death' ". Then, she
said, "He put them in his trunk." The evidence offered would
seem to consist of: (1) nonverbal conduct of the alleged testator in
exhibiting as a will a paper which tended to prove that he meant
the paper to be a will; and (2) words tending to prove the same
thing. Is this conduct, nonverbal and verbal, hearsay? The words
alone, being post-testamentary declarations of an alleged testator
offered for an assertive purpose, would be inadmissible hearsay in
West Virginia 63 and in most jurisdictions."4 Is such post-testamen-
tary nonverbal conduct, when offered to prove the same thing,
admissible if the equivalent utterance is inadmissible? Suppose that
the housekeeper had asked Ross to show her his will, and Ross,
without saying a word, had shown her the paper for her to read,
and had then put the paper back in his trunk for safekeeping.
Would this conduct be hearsay if offered to prove that Ross had
intended the exhibited paper to be his will? The court lumped
all this evidence together and discussed its admissibility at con-
siderable length. But the court refused to pass squarely on the
question of admissibility for the reason that the evidence was not
objected to in the trial court. The tenor of the court's argument,
however, would seem to indicate that under the West Virginia
cases cited the court would probably have excluded both the con-
duct and the words if the evidence had been properly objected to
in the trial court and an exception taken.65 And, interestingly,
Wigmore concedes that most cases (the orthodox decisions) ex-
clude such post-testamentary conduct and utterances.6 Further-
612 WIGMoR, EVIDE1CE § 267.
62 83 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1954).
63 See Swann y. Swan, 131 W. Va. 555, 48 S.E.2d 425 (1948).
64 See 6 WIGMoRr, EvmNr.Nc § 1736, citing cases pro and con.
65 See 83 S.E.2d at 768, 769.
66 See 2 Wiooa, EviDENCE §§ 271, 272.
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more, Wigmore concedes that, apart from a few groups of instances,
the common law has generally "insisted on the application of the
Hearsay rule to conduct which was equivalent to an extra-judicial
assertion." 67  Also Jones on Evidence defines hearsay as "that kind
of evidence which derives its value, not solely from the credit to
be attached to the witness himself, but also in part because of the
veracity and competency of some other person from whom the wit-
ness may have received his information." 68 Jones then states flatly
that such evidence is "to be rejected without regard to its character,
as being oral or written statements or acts."6 9
While many additional illustrations of such conduct, offered
apparently for its assertive value, could be cited, one further
example must suffice; and the West Virginia case of State v. Bickle7°
furnishes an interesting concluding illustration. That case raised
a question as to whether the failure of the accused to escape from
jail when he had the opportunity to do so is admissible to prove
his innocence. Such conduct, offered for that purpose, is relevant
as impliedly asserting a belief or consciousness of innocence. The
West Virginia court, and most courts, exclude such conduct. Wig-
more argues in favor of admissiblity,7 ' largely no doubt for the
reason that he does not, for the most part, seem to regard extra-
judicial nonverbal conduct offered for such a purpose as hearsay.
And, indeed, the Wigmorean theory by and large has more to
commend it, it would seem, than does the orthodox approach; for,
as herein sketchily indicated in part, there can be little doubt that
the orthodox common-law concept of hearsay excludes a great deal
of evidence which common sense if not judicial experience tells
us should be considered in a modern court of justice.
From this rather cursory discussion it would seem to be evident
enough that the authorities are in such chaotic conflict as to the
coverage of the so-called hearsay rule that it is often impossible to
predict with any degree of assurance as to what a given court will
decide. Various remedies have been suggested. It is believed, how-
ever, that the following highly salutary proposal advanced in the
latest textbook on Evidence72 is on the whole an approach which
lawyers may laudably advocate and judges justifiably adopt:
67 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 267.
68 1 JONES, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 297 (4th ed. 1938).
69 Id. § 298. Emphasis supplied.
70 53 W. Va. 597, 45 S.E. 917 (1903).
71 See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 293.
72 McCoR8mcE, EVIDENCE § 229.
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"The existing practice, it seems, should be modified in
one of two ways," says McCormick on Evidence. 3 "If accord-
ing to present orthodoxy, we are to continue to classify as hear-
say, acts to show the actor's belief to show the truth of the fact
believed, then an exception to the hearsay rule should be recog-
nized for such evidence, under reasonable safeguards for its
reliability.7 4
"The taboo of hearsay is strong, however, and securing
recognition for a new exception in this ill-explored area, would
be an uphill task. The present writer believes, accordingly,
that much the more viable path to improvement is the alterna-
tive theory which would limit hearsay to assertions, namely
to statements, oral or written, or acts intended to be communi-
cative, such as signals and the sign-language, when offered to
prove the truth of the facts asserted. Other acts and conduct,
including silence, when offered to show belief to prove the
fact believed, would be classed (as many decisions have classed
it) as circumstantial evidence.7 5 The debate, then, upon the
admission of any particular item of conduct-evidence offered
for this purpose, would be upon the question whether it meets
the standard of relevancy by which all circumstantial evidence
is tested. This standard, applied by the trial judge, is whether
the probative value of the evidence, upon the inference for
which it is offered, is sufficiently substantial to justify the time
involved in receiving it, and to outweigh any dangers of con-
fusion and prejudice."76
73 Ibid.
74 "Among the most practical proposals for such safeguards are the follow-
ing by Dean Falknor: ". . . The suggestion, then, is that while hearsay should
be defined so as to include not only utterances but also non-assertive conduct,
where relevancy depends upon inferences from the conduct to the belief of the
actor to the fact believed, evidence of such non-assertive conduct should be
exceptionally admitted if, but only if, the trial judge first finds that (a) the
actor had personal knowledge of the fact (i.e., the occurrence of the event or
the existence of the condition) to the proof of which the evidence is offered;
more precisely, that it fairly appears that the actor observed or had the op-
portunity to observe such event or condition and that nothing appears to cast
substantial doubt upon the quality of his recollection at the time of the
conduct; and (b) that the conduct was important or significant to the actor
in his affairs and so vouched his belief "as to give reasonable assurance of
trustworthiness", and (c) in the case of negative conduct (i.e., inaction) or
silence, that such negative conduct or silence was a detriment to the actor.'
Silence as Hearsay, 89 U.Pa.L.Rev. 192, 216 (1940)." MCCORMICK, EVmENCa §
229 n.31.
75 Here the author inserts this footnote: "This approach is adopted by the
decisions, forming a numerous though a minority group, which decline to
treat conduct as hearsay, see notes, 16-25, supra. It is persuasively advocated by
Murchison, 24 N.C.L. Rev. 274, 282 (1946). This seems also to be the view
adopted in Uniform Rule 62 (1) which includes in the definition of statement
'non verbal conduct ... intended ... as a substitute for words in expressing
the matter stated,' and Rule 63, which limits 'hearsay' to 'statements.'"
76 As to the kind of questions which the trial judge may well consider in
passing on the admissibility of such conduct, see Falknor, Silence as Hearsay,
89 U. or PA. L. REv. 192, 216, 217 (1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE 479.
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Moreover, the trial judge should be accorded a wide margin of
discretion in applying this general standard to nonverbal conduct
offered for a purpose forbidden by the orthodox rule.", Further-
more, in borderline cases of doubt as to whether challenged con-
duct, nonverbal or verbal, falls within the hearsay fringe, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of admissibility as the modem policy of
the law is to admit all relevant evidence unless it positively appears
that some rule or principle of law excludes it.78
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that this discussion is
not intended to be exhaustive: it is intended, for the most part, to
be merely suggestive. And one suggestion which should perhaps
be further stressed is the fairly obvious one that many if not most
cases falling within or near the hearsay fringe contain little or no
analysis, and often no mention, of the hearsay problem involved.
This lack of analysis is no doubt largely responsible for the fact
that there is so much conflict and uncertainty in the decisions and
in the textbooks as to the exact location of the border line between
hearsay and nonhearsay. 9 This fringe area-this twilight zone of
hearsay-is therefore a fertile field which laffords great opportuni-
ty for the practitioner in presenting his case in court-an oppor-
tunity which, more frequently than otherwise, seems to be unduly
neglected. And it is a field which, it is submitted, could be
profitably cultivated.
77 Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N.W. 922 (1924);
Menard v. Cashman, 94 N.H. 428, 55 A.2d 156 (1947).
78 See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S.
474, 479 (1951); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREAnsE ON EvmFi'cE 265, 530 (1898).
79 See, generally, McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489
(1930); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. Rlv. 1138 (1935);
Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1937); Morgan, Some Sugges-
tions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 258 (1938);
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 177 (1948); Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rkv. 192 (1940);
Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REv. 271 (1952).
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